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Abstract
There are large differences in the employment to population ratio
relative to the US across OECD countries, and these differences are
even larger for the old age (55-69 years). There are also large differ-
ences in various features of social security, such as the replacement rate,
the entitlement age or whether it is allowed to collect social security and
working. These observations suggest that they might be an important
factor. I assess quantitatively this hypothesis using a life cycle general
equilibrium model of retirement. I find that the differences in social
security can indeed account for the differences in employment to pop-
ulation ratio at old age in the OECD. I also evaluate which features of
social security are most important in this context and find that generos-
ity and whether it allows collecting social security while working are the
most important contributors.
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1 Introduction
There are large differences in employment to population ratio across OECD
countries. In 2006 it ranges from 42% in Turkey to 66% in Norway. These dif-
ferences are even larger for older persons: the employment to population ratio
for ages 60-64 ranges from 13% in Hungary to 60% in New Zealand. At the
same time there are large differences in the features of social security systems
across the OECD. For example, the replacement rate ranges from 38% in Mex-
ico to 124% in Turkey, while entitlement ages varies from 55 in Australia to 67
in Norway. Some countries (such as Denmark) do not allow collecting social
security benefits and working while others (such as Canada) do not impose any
restrictions. My paper seeks to answer two questions: Can these differences
in social security account for the large differences in employment per person
at old ages? What features of social security are the most important contrib-
utors in accounting for these differences? Understanting these two questions
is very important for policy considerations, as demographic projections show
that population over 50 will be more than half of the working age population
in 2050.
To answer to these questions I develop a life cycle general equilibrium
model of retirement with a discrete labor choice, idiosyncratic labor income
risk and incomplete markets. The model is calibrated to match key statis-
tics of the US economy and its social security system. A key feature of my
model is that I am able to capture the heterogeneity in employment by age
that it is found in the data, which is a desirable property if we want to study
cross country heterogeneity in retirement. For example, in the US more than
60% of the population is working at age 62, and 40% is still working at age
65. My model is able to capture very well the employment profile of ages 50-80.
To evaluate the effects of differences in social security across countries, I
solve for the stationary equilibrium of the model with the same parametriza-
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tion of the US but with the social security systems of each OECD country. My
main findings are as follows. First, it turns out that the differences in social
security account for a large part of the differences in retirement behavior. One
way of illustrating this finding is to compare the coefficients of variation of
employment to population across OECD countries observed in the data with
those generated by the model. At ages 60-64 this statistic is .45 in the data and
it is .42 in the model. At ages 65-69 it is .8 in the data and .70 in the model.
As a matter of fact, the correlation between the data and model predictions is
of .73 for ages 60-64 and .75 for ages 65-69. This means that my model cap-
tures much of the variability found in the data. Second, when I ask what are
the most salient characteristics of social security that account for differences
in retirement, it turns out that generosity and restrictions on collecting social
security and working are very important, while differences in entitlement age
are not. To assess the magnitude of each, I shut down the characteristics of
social security to US levels one by one. I find that the coefficient of variation
of employment to population at ages 60-64 in the model is .20 when only gen-
erosity is active and .22 when only the restriction on collecting social security
while working is active. In contrast, it is only .05 when only the entitlement
age is active. It follows that generosity and restrictions on collecting social
security and working each account for roughly 50% of the variability in the
model. I find little evidence that there are significant interactions across these
three features.
My paper is most related to two streams of literature. The first one fol-
lows Prescott (2004), that sought to explain large differences in hours of work
through differences in the average tax rate for G-7 economies, using a stand-in
household growth model1. Prescott et. al (2007) and Rogerson & Wallenius
(2009) developed a life cycle model with an intensive and extensive margin in
the labor choice to analyze the effect of a simple tax and transfer system on
1Many papers have studied the impact of differences in taxes on hours of work. For
example: Ohanian et al. (2007), Rogerson (2007), McDaniel (2009) and Ragan (2005)
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hours of work. It turns out that the results are similar to Prescott. Wallenius
(2008) extends this framework to include human capital accumulation and
studies differences in hours per capita of Belgium, France and Germany that
are generated through differences in social security. She finds that social se-
curity has large effects on hours of work, mostly through the extensive margin.
Relative to Wallenius my paper has two important characteristics. First,
my model incorporates heterogeneity and it is able to match the distribution
of retirement that it is found in the data whereas in her model everybody
retires at the same age. Second, I compute outcomes for a much larger set
of countries. While I also find large effects of social security, heterogeneity
reduces the impact on employment to population. These smaller effects can
be due to a smaller response of individuals to social security when there is
labor income risk or to composition effects; as when there is mortality risk the
weight of older individuals on the total population is smaller. To investigate
the role of heterogeneity I cut the variance of the income risk by a half and
recalibrate the model to match the US economy. I find that a country with a
social security system two times more generous that the US, and everything
else equal, will have an employment to population ratio 3% below of the US
in a world with half the labor income risk, whereas the employment to pop-
ulation ratio will be 6% below of the US in a world with all the idiosincratic
labor income risk. Note that twice the variance implies twice the effect on
employment. Furthermore, the employment to population ratio at ages 60-64
will be 9% below of the US in the former case, whereas it will be 25% below
of the US in world with the amount of idiosyncratic labor income risk found
in the data. This points out to mortality risk and the implied age structure of
the population in my model as the main contributor to this discrepancy2. An
aditional advantage of this model is that it can be used to study how social
security impacts the ability of indviduals to insure against risk and it can be
2More experimentation is needed to check for the importance of heterogeneity in each
OECD country.
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used for welfare comparissons. These applications are left for future extensions.
A second stream of literature studies different aspects of social security. I
will not attempt to survey it here as it is very extense3. The most related
reference from this literature is French (2005,2007). He develops a model with
labor income, health risk and incomplete markets to study the role of social
security in accounting for retirement behavior in the US. He finds the market
incompleteness plus social security are key to understand retirement behav-
ior. This provides some support to the importance of the assumptions in my
model. I depart from his work in that I include general equilibrium. This is an
important extension if we want to study cross country differences in retirement.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section I doc-
ument the differences in retirement, employment and social security across
the OECD. Section 3 presents the model. Section 4 describes the calibra-
tion procedure. Section 5 describes the counterfactual experiments and their
results. Finally, section 6 concludes and outlines directions for future research.
2 Employment and social security in OECD
This section presents empirical evidence for OECD countries in 2006. I use
labor force statistics by age and sex from OECD on-line database4 and so-
cial security data from “Pensions at Glance 2009” and the “Total Economy
Database5” There are large differences in employment to population ratio6.
3For example, Gustman and Steinmeier (1986), Stock and Wise (1990), Gruber and Wise
(2004, 2007), Coile and Gruber (2007), Phelan & Rust (1998), French (2005,2007), Hugget &
Ventura (1999) and Nishiyama % Smetters (2007) to mention a few important contributions
to the study of social security
4http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx
5The Conference Board and Groningen Growth and Development Center
6I define employment to population ratio as the ratio of employees age 20-75 to individuals
20-75. My model economy will have an initial age of 20 and few individuals work past age
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Turkey has the lowest employment rate at 42% of the US whereas Norway is
at 66%. These differences are even larger for older individuals. If we look at
ages 60-64 the difference are even larger, ranging from 13% in Hungary to 60%
in New Zealand (see Figure 1) The US has an employment to population ratio
of 65% and it is 51% for ages 60-64, therefore employment to population ratio
ranges from .6 to 1.02 of the US and employment to population ratio at 60-64
ranges from .2 to 1.2 of the US.
Figure 1: Employment differences in OECD
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These differences are not driven by productivity, as there are countries
with low employment to population ratio like Belgium (48%), Italy (50%),
France (57%) or Germany (56%) that has relatively high labor productivity
relative to the US7 (in the same order 101%, 87%, 98% and 95% respectively)
We could think that these differences are driven by differences in demographic
structure. Figure 2 shows that the correlation between the ratio of population
60-64 and 65-69 to total population and employment to population is close to
zero when both groups are considered together and it is positive for ages 60-64.
75. Also OECD has data limitations beyond age 70-74.
7The coeffient of correlation for the sample is .4. Alonso & Rogerson (2009) show that
labor productivity may be high in countries with high taxes, via selection effects on employ-
ment
6
Figure 2: Demographic Composition and Employment
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
OECD Countries
Em
pl
oy
m
en
t t
o 
Po
pu
la
tio
n 
Ra
tio
(a) 60-64
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
OECD Countries
Em
pl
oy
m
en
t t
o 
Po
pu
la
tio
n 
60
−6
4
(b) 65-69
There are large differences in social security across the OECD. I choose
three key features of social security to explore. The first key feature is generos-
ity, defined as pre-retirement net earnings to pension entitlement at retirement
age for an average earner8. The OECD computes this statistic for single indi-
viduals that entered the labor market at age 20 and had a continuous earnings
history9.
The second key feature is entitlement age. The OECD countries usually
have two different entitlement ages: early entitlement age and normal en-
titlement age. They may depend on sex and occupation. I focus on early
entitlement age of males and abstract from differences in entitlement age by
occupation. Figure 4 summarizes the large differences in generosity and enti-
tlement age across the OECD.
Finally, countries across the OECD impose different restrictions on collect-
ing social security and working. For example, Denmark gives social security
only to those individuals that are not employed, while other countries like
8This is known as replacement rate
9More details on how OECD computes this statistic can be found in the Appendix
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Figure 3: Generosity and Entitlement Age
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Canada do not impose any restriction at all. A third group of countries have
social security that is mean tested in the sense that social security is taxed
away if labor earnings are above some threshold. If a country allows for some
sort of compensation that is actuarially fair, there should not be major effects
from the tax on social security. The US after 2000 is in this case. I summarize
these restriction by a single parameter and I call it implicit tax on continuing
to work. Duval (2003) computes this tax for some OECD countries at different
ages (55, 60 and 65) Figure 5 shows the value of the tax at entitlement age for
each country10.
OECD countries cluster on three different ranges: one third have implicit
tax rates below 20%, one third have taxes between 20% and 50% and the last
third have taxes over 50%. I assume that this last third will have an implicit
tax rate on continuing to work of 100%. I further check if there is any explicit
restriction described in the summmary “Social Security around the World”
provided by the US Social Security Administration.
10I choose the implicit tax from Duval (2003) that is closer to the entitlement age.
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Figure 4: Implicit Taxes on Continuing to Work
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3 Model Economy
This section describes assumptions about demographics, preferences and en-
dowments, technology, policy and market structure.
3.1 Demographics
Demographic structure is stable, but the size of the population (N) grows at
a constant rate n. Any given person of age a survives to the next period with
probability sa. Individuals have a maximum life length of A years. A given the
population growth and the survival probabilities, each age group represents a
constant fraction of the population µa
11.
3.2 Preferences and endowments
Every individual has identical preferences over sequences of consumption {ca}
and leisure {ha}. Consumption must be non negative and I assume that hours
of work can take two values: zero or h¯. Every individual is endowed with one
11This number is obtained with the following recursion: µa+1 =
sa+1
1+n
µa and I normalize
the weights to 1, so
∑
a
µa = 1.
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unit of time each period and have preferences given by12:
E0
[
A∑
a=1
βa
(
a∏
j=1
sj
)
u (ca, 1− ha)
]
(1)
3.3 Individual productivity
Individuals in my economy are endowed each period with different productiv-
ities (zi,a), where i index each individual. These differences come from two
different sources: a deterministic component that depends on age and it is
hump-shaped (zda) and an idiosyncratic component independent for each indi-
vidual (zwi,a), characterized by an AR(1)
log(zi,a) = log(z
d
a) + log(z
w
i,a) (2)
3.4 Technology
There is a representative firm that operates a constant returns to scale tech-
nology that transforms aggregate capital (K) and aggregate efficiency units of
labor (L) into a homogeneous and perfectly divisible product (Y ). Aggregate
capital and labor are obtained by aggregating through individuals. Capital de-
preciates at a rate δ. Output can be used for either consumption or investment.
3.5 Markets
There are capital, labor and product markets that open at each date and op-
erate in perfect competition. There are no insurance markets. As in Aiyagari
(1994) and individuals can not borrow and accumulate precautionary savings.
12Note that this preferences imply that individuals are not altruistic towards future gen-
erations
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I will characterize the stationary equilibrium of these markets.
3.6 Social Security
Social security is defined by two elements. First, a payroll tax (τ) that is
levied on every worker. Second a function φ(e¯a, ha, a) that characterizes the
relation between the average of individual’s earnings histories (e¯) and social
security benefit. Note that it is a function of age as individuals do not get
social security until entitlement age (aˆ) and it is also a function of the labor
choice, to capture restrictions on collecting social security and working.
3.7 Accidental Bequests
As individuals may die with positive probability every period they may leave
some capital. I assume that government collects this capital and distribute it
lump sum among those individuals alive (B).
3.8 Recursive Stationary Representation of the Individ-
ual Decision
I represent the individual decision problem recursively. I abstract from the
time dimension to save notation as I will use a stationary characterization of
the equilibrium. The individual state variables of the economy are: wealth
(k), the idiosyncratic component of productivity (zw), average earnings (e¯)
and age (a). Each period, individuals decide how much to consume (c), how
much capital to hold (k′) and employment (h) for every combination of the
individual state variables.
Taking interest rates (r), wages (w), payroll tax (τ), social security (φ(e¯a, ha, a))
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and accidental bequests (B) as given, each individual solves the following Bell-
man equation:
Va(k, z
w, e¯) = maxc,k′,h u(c, 1− h) + βsa+1Ezw [Va+1(k, z
′w, e¯′)]
s.t. c+ k′ = (1 + r)k + (1− τ)wzah+ φ(e¯, ha, a) +B
(3)
3.9 Aggregate State Variable
The aggregate state variable of the economy is a list of measures over the
individual state variables {Ψa(k, z
w, e¯)} that can be easily obtained iterating
forward using the optimal decisions of the individuals and the idiosyncratic
labor income process; assuming that they enter the economy with zero wealth,
zero average earnings, and with a draw from the stationary distribution of
the idiosyncratic productivity shock. The aggregate state is used to aggregate
individual choices to get prices in the stationary equilibrium.
3.10 Stationary Recursive Competitive Equilibrium
To save notation I collect individual state variables but age in a vector x =
(k, zw, e¯) and age, a.
A stationary recursive competitive equilibrium is a list of functions and
scalars: (ca(x),k
′
a(x),ha(x),Va(x),φ(e¯, ha, a),Ψa(x),w,r,τ ,K,L,B) such that:
1. ca(x),k
′
a(x),ha(x) and Va(x) solve equation (4) for every a = 1, ..., A− 1
2. K and L solve the representative firm profit maximization problem, so
input prices are given by the first order conditions: r = FK(K,L) − δ
and w = FL(K,L)
3. Markets clear
(a)
∑
a µa
∫
X
[ca(x) + k
′
a(x)] dΨa = F (K,L) + (1− δ)K
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(b)
∑
a µa
∫
X
k′a(x)dΨa = (1 + n)K
(c)
∑
a µa
∫
X
zaha(x)dΨa = L
4. The aggregate state is consistent with individual behavior
5. Social security is balanced
τL =
∑
a≥aˆ
µa
∫
X
φ(e¯, ha(x), a)dΨa
6. Accidental bequest are distributed evenly among individuals alive
∑
a
µa(1− sa+1)
∫
X
(1 + r)k′a(x)dΨa = B(1 + n)
4 Calibration
I calibrate the model to key features of the US economy. Some parameters
are pinned down individually from sources exogenous to the model, like demo-
graphics, the individual productivity process, the fraction of time working and
social security, whereas technology is pinned down individually from solving
the stationary equilibrium of the model to match a single statistic. Finally,
preferences are jointly pinned down to match some key statistics.
4.1 Parameters calibrated individually
I need to choose growth rate of population (n), the age individuals enter the
economy, life length (A), survival rates (sa), productivity process (za), fraction
of time working (h¯) and social security.
4.1.1 Demographics
I choose population growth rate to equal the US 1960-2006 average of 1.2%.
This number is taken from the US Census Bureau Statistical abstract 2009.
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Individuals enter the economy with 20 years and they die with probability 1
when they are 94, therefore A = 75. Survival rates are taken from the actu-
arial tables for males provided by the US Social Security Administration in
2004. Figure 5 shows survival rates for the selected life span and the implied
stationary population weights.
Figure 5: Survival and Stationary Weights
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4.1.2 Individual productivity process
Individual productivity zi,a is characterized by two components: a hump-
shaped deterministic function of age (zda) and a stochastic component that
hits each individual every period of her life (zwi,a).
To characterize the deterministic component, I use annual earnings from
IPUMS-CPS over the period 1992-2006 and annual hours worked. I express
annual earnings in $US1982 and assume that they grow at a 2% rate due to
productivity gains13. I construct hourly wages dividing annual earnings and
annual hours. I compute the ratio of mean hourly wage by age to mean hourly
wage. This looks like a hump shaped profile. I adjust a quadratic polynomial
to eliminate sample variability and truncate the polinomial to zero when it
13Therefore I assume there are time effects
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goes below zero (80 years) This is not an important assumption as very few
individuals are working that old. Figure 6 shows the result. Cohorts from 35
to 55 years are more productive than the average and between cohort produc-
tivity peaks at age 45.
Figure 6: Between Cohort Productivity (zda)
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The stochastic component of individual productivity is characterized by an
AR(1)
log(zwa+1) = ρ log(z
w
a ) + ǫa+1
with ǫa+1
iid
→ N(0, σ2ǫ ) The parameters ρ and σ
2
ǫ are taken from French (2005)
and equal .977 and .0141 respectively.
Finally, the fraction of time spent working is set to 45% of available time
in a year, assuming 12 hours for commuting, eating and sleeping and a year
of 360 days (h¯ = .45)
4.1.3 Technology
I assume the technology is Cobb-Douglas, Y = KαL1−α. I choose α to match
a labor share value from NIPA of .64. The depreciation rate is set such that
the ratio of investment to output equals .2.
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4.1.4 Social security
Social security (φ(a, ha, e¯)) is a a function of three elements. First, it depends
on age (a) through an entitlement age (aˆ). I assume that individuals may get
the pension when they reach the early entitlement age in the OECD. In the US
it is 62 years. I abstract from the normal entitlement age and the decision to
claim for benefits to keep the decision problem and the state space as small as
possible, and because it is of second order importance to study cross country
retirement behavior. Generically, individuals can not borrow against social
security, poor individuals would like to get benefits as they become available
and if I set entitlement to the normal entitlement age, these would affect their
employment choices. Rich individuals would not be affected by these in any
case.
Social security is a function of employment choices through the restrictions
on collecting social security and working. I assume that if a country has such
restriction, social security will be zero if employment is positive and a func-
tion of individual average earnings otherwise, whereas it will be a function of
individual average earnings if the country does not have such restriction. To
determine if a country restricts social security and working I use the implicit
tax on continuing to work provided by Duval (2003) and details on social
security systems around the world provided by the US Social Security Admin-
istration.
Social security is a piece-wise linear function of average individual earnings
(e¯) as in Hugget & Ventura (1999), French (2005) or Nishiyama & Smetters
(2007) The bend-points are multiples of the economy-wide average earnings
so it can be directly taken to the model economy. US social security replace
90% of the first monthly $761, 32% from $761 and through $4,586, and 15%
above $4,586. This is equivalent to .2,1.24 and 2.47 in multiples of annualized
average earnings. Therefore social security can be writen as
φ(e¯a, ha, a) =
{
0 if a < aˆ or ha = h¯
ϕ(e¯a) otherwise
16
Figure 7: ϕ(e¯)
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Finally, I made some additional simplifications. Social security takes into
account the 35 years of highest earnings while I just take the simple average,
capped for individual earnings higher than 247% of average earnings. I also
assume that there are not limit for taxation while in the US earnings above
roughly $100,000 are exempt My objective is to focus on three key elements
common to every country on the OECD rather than introducing details that
may be important is some conuntries but totally absent in others.
4.2 Parameters calibrated jointly
4.2.1 Preferences
I assume that utility is separable in consumption and leisure and take the
following form
u(c, 1− h) =
c1−σ
1− σ
+ λ · (1− h) (4)
this function is characterized by the relative risk aversion (σ) and the weight
of leisure, (λ) Individuals discount the future at the rate β.
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4.2.2 Calibration Objective
I assume a model period of 1 year and choose (σ, λ, β) jointly to match the
following key statistics of the US economy: a capital-output ratio of 3.0, an
investment-output ratio of .2, a labor share of .64 and the employment to
population ratio from ages 50 to 80. I get employment to population ratio from
the same sample of the CPS that I used to get hourly wages. As I have more
moments than parameters I choose the vector of parameters to calibrate to
minimize the square deviation of the moments from the data and the simulated
moments. I use the Nelder-Meade algorithm to find the minimum.
4.3 Calibration results
Table 1 shows the results of the calibration. Relative risk aversion (σ) is within
the range of the values found in the literature which vary from 1 to 8, β is in
the low range for life cycle models but I still get a hump-shaped consumption
profile.
Table 1: Parameters
A n σ λ β α δ ρ σ2ǫ
75 .012 2.50 2.50 .97 .36 .066 .977 .0141
The model matches the ratios of capital and investment to output and
the labor share perfectly. It is also successful matching the employment to
population ratio by age. Figure 8 shows the match of employment rates for
ages 50-8014.
This is a key feature of my model as I need an accurate representation of
the employment to population to do cross country comparisons. French (2005)
also match the employment profile but he seems to over-estimate employment
by age above age 62 more than I do. That he attempts to match the wealth
distribution at the same time is the most likely reason of his results. To match
the accumulation of wealth in the top wealth quintile you need a high β but
14After 80 almost nobody is working and in my model nobody is working.
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Figure 8: Employment rate fit
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this would also induce individuals to retire early. In French (2007) he partially
solves this issue introducing heterogeneous preferences.
5 Policy experiments
In this section I describe the experiments that allow me to do cross country
comparisons of employment to population at older ages and what are the
features of social security that affect employment the most.
5.1 Description of the Experiments
Section 2 documented large differences in employment to population and retire-
ment to population at older ages across OECD countries. It also documented
large differences in social security. As I get a very good fit of the model to the
US, I use the US as a benchmark and express all the employment statistics
relative to it. I also express the generosity of the social security relative to the
US.
To account for differences in employment through differences in social se-
curity I solve the stationary equilibrium of the model for different parameter-
izations of social security to mimic the differences in generosity, entitlement
age and restrictions on collecting social security and working. The I compare
19
the results of the simulations to the OECD employment data for 2006.
I begin with the employment to population 60-64 because it is the most
common age of retirement. Still, there are some countries that have entitle-
ment ages below 60 or above 64, so I group these countries by entitlement
age and compute the employment to population around entitlement age. This
means that if a country like Italy which has entitlement age of 57 is to be com-
pared to the US, I use the employment to population for ages 55-59. Finally
I pin down the features of social security that are key to generate the large
differences in employment to population found in the data by shutting down
to US levels some features of social security while leaving others active.
5.2 Results
5.2.1 Retirement relative to the US
First, the differences in social security account for the large differences in
retirement behavior. This is a surprising result as my model allows for differ-
ences along three key dimensions of social security only. Figure 9 illustrates
the ability of the model to match the retirement behavior, measured as the
employment to population ratio relative to the US. The bars are OECD coun-
tries’ data and the dots are model simulations for OECD countries. Countries
are sorted from low to high employment to population 60-64 relative to the
US.
The model does a very good job matching the size of the differences and the
pattern that is observed in the data and it is also able to make accurate predic-
tions for many OECD countries. Austria, Poland, Italy and Czech Republic
stand out as outliers. My model accounts for two thirds of employment vari-
ability of Turkey, Greece and Finland and over-predicts employment of UK,
Ireland and Mexico. Korea and Sweden are under-predicted but the model
captures almost all the variability. Assuming that there are not measurement
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Figure 9: Employment to population 60-64
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issues in the OECD data, there are a few potential reasons for these discrep-
ancies. First, there are some countries that have retirement ages that do not
fall within the ages 60-64 and my model may capture behavior at entitlement
age better. All the countries mentioned above but Turkey, Greece and Finland
(with entitlement ages 60,60 and 62 respectively) have entitlement ages below
60 (Italy, Czech Republic and Korea) or above 64 (Austria, Poland, UK, Ire-
land and Mexico)
I address this issue computing employment to population for countries
grouped by retirement age. Figure 10 shows the fit of employment for countries
with entitlement ages less than 60 (Figure 10 (a)) and entitlement ages greater
than 64 (Figure 10 (b)).
The model fit is better at entitlement age as it is illustrated when I group
countries by entitlement age. But why does the model miss some variability in
post-entitlement employment of countries with entitlement age smaller than 60
and pre-entitlement employment in countries with entitlement age bigger than
21
Figure 10: Employment to population at entitlement age
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(a) Entitlement age < 60
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(b) Entitlement age > 64
64. One potential weakness in my modeling choices could be the assumption
about restrictions on collecting social security and working. For countries in
which collecting social security and working is not totally forbidden, assuming
so it is a judgment call. In the real world these incentives on continuing work
are not constant after early retirement and they would require a detailed mod-
eling of normal retirement age and the entitlement choice, or an age dependent
tax on social security that captured the incentives with some accuracy. I leave
this as a future extension as I am already performing relatively well and it
would increase computational burden without clear advantages. Figure 11
shows the model simulations under two different assumptions: all countries
restrict collecting social security and working, and all countries do not.
The message that we get from these experiments is that these three key
features of social security are able to explain a substantial amount of retirement
behavior.
5.2.2 Employment Relative to the US
The differences in social security also account for a substantial amount of the
differences in employment. These differences are accounted through retirement
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Figure 11: Sensitivity to Implicit Tax
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behavior. Figure 12 shows the fit of employment to population relative to the
US. There are many factors that may affect employment behavior during a life
so it is remarkable that social security is able to account for such a big amount.
It is also worth noting the role of restrictions on collecting social security
and working. Figure 12 is analogous to Figure 11 and show how sensitive is
the employment to population ratio to assuming that every country restricts
collecting social security and working and that no country does.
My model still misses for non-European countries like Turkey and Mexico,
Eastern European countries like Poland, Hungary and Slovak Republic and
Belgium, Italy, France and Germany. An extension that included differences
in income taxation independent of social security would fill part of what is
missing on Continental European countries. Turkey, Mexico, Greece and Italy
have female populations that are not as integrated into the labor force and
when I look at the employment to population of males relative to the US I
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Figure 12: Employment to population
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
OECD Countries
Em
pl
oy
m
en
t t
o 
Po
pu
la
tio
n
(R
ela
tiv
e t
o t
he
 U
S)
 
 
OECD Countries
Model Predictions
Figure 13: Sensitivity of Employment to Implicit Tax
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get a different picture. Figure 14 shows the fit of the model when I restrict
to males. Note that the picture for retirement will not change that much
24
as retirement decisions are usually coordinated. Still retirement decisions of
couples is an interesting topic by itself and how different treatment of social
security of spouses may matter for individual and joint retirement choices.
Figure 14: Employment to population, males
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5.2.3 What features of social security are most important?
Using an eyeball measure it is possible to tell that implicit taxes on continu-
ing to work is an important feature of social security to generate retirement
and employment variability. I can use some counter-factual simulations to pin
down the most relevant features of social security. First I will focus on the
individual role of each key feature of social security: generosity, entitlement
age and implicit tax on continuing to work. I let one feature active at a time
and set the other features to the US levels. My measure of variability is the
coefficient of variation of the data and the model. I compute the standard
deviation of employment relative to the US for different ages and the mean.
The ratio of the standard deviation to the mean gives a unit-less measure of
25
variability. I do the same for my model simulations of OECD countries.
Figure 15: Features that account for variability
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(a) Individual features
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(b) Interactions
Figure 15 (a) shows that the most important features are the implicit tax on
continuing to work and generosity, while the entitlement age is not important.
As there are potentially important interactions I allow two features active at
the same time. I find that generosity and implicit tax on continuing to work
account for almost all the variability after age 60 but I need the three features
to generate variability as in the data for ages 55-59 (Figure 15 (b))
6 Conclusion and Future Research
I have built a life cycle general equilibrium model of retirement behavior to
account for the differences in retirement and employment across OECD coun-
tries relative to the US. My results point out to the importance of differences
in three key features of social security: generosity, entitlement age and implicit
tax on continuing to work. With just these three, I account for a substantial
amount of the large differences in retirement and employment found in the
data.
26
My model opens up some interesting research possibilities. Even if just
three features of social security account for retirement and employment there
is another feature of social security that may be interesting to explore, which
is redistribution. How do we define redistribution? Assume that a good mea-
sure of redistribution is the social security entitlement over mean earnings at
the age of retirement of an individual that earns two times the mean earnings
of the country minus this same statistic for an individual that earns just half
of the mean earnings of the country. If we accept that measure of redistribu-
tion, there are also large differences in redistribution across OECD countries.
It is likely that different redistribution provide different incentives over the
life cycle and it may play an important complementary role with generosity.
It turns out that it is not easy to separate which part is generosity as any
change in generosity ex ante change redistribution ex post and vice-versa. My
model offers the possibility to account for both generosity and redistribution
if social security was calibrated to match generosity and redistribution in the
data (which are ex-post measures) In addition, other details of social security
may matter for cross country differences in retirement and employment. Many
countries have a minimum universal component of social security that is not
linked to the earnings history of an individual and modeling this may help
to understand the quantitative importance of social security to account for
different labor supplies.
Why do some countries have higher employment to population relative to
the US but still lower hours of work per person. Pijoan-Mas (2006) as it was
pointed out in the introduction, shows that the competitive equilibrium of an
economy with idiosyncratic labor income risk and incomplete markets has in-
efficiently high hours of work. An exercise worth doing would be to introduce
an intensive margin as in French (2005) and inquire about the role of social
security to account for differences in hours of work and employment. Also the
framework proposed by Prescott, Rogerson & Wallenius (2007) and Wallenius
(2009) could be extended to include within cohort heterogeneity. A similar ex-
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ercise is done by Krebs (2004) to study the welfare gains of stabilizing business
cycle fluctuations in a model with human capital formation but no labor choice,
finding big welfare gains from reducing fluctuations. Potentially we would be
able to understand the effect of social security through human capital forma-
tion and using hours or the length of working careers to self insure income risk.
A third interesting extension would be to model single and couple behavior
at the same time. It is a well known fact that couples tend to retire about the
same time. In addition, almost all OECD countries have a differential treat-
ment of female spouses in social security. What is the role of social security
rules by sex in shaping retirement decisions of males and females?
Finally, all the space in this paper has been devoted to social security,
which is the biggest tax and transfer program across the OECD. Health insur-
ance programs are of the same order of magnitude in the GDP and they may
also play an important role into shaping employment over the life cycle. Un-
derstanding how different health insurance programs affect employment across
the OECD will require introducing health explicitly and will throw an inter-
esting insight on the current policy debate about health, ongoing in the US.
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8 Appendix A: OECD Social Security Data
Table 2: OECD Social security
Country Gross Generosity Net Generosity Entitlement Implicit Tax
AUS 1.07 1.19 55 0.00
AUT 2.07 2.02 65 1.00
BEL 1.09 1.42 60 1.00
CAN 1.15 1.29 60 0.00
CZR 1.28 1.43 58.5 0.00
DN 2.07 2.04 65 0.00
FIN 1.45 1.39 62 1.00
FR 1.38 1.47 60 1.00
DEU 1.11 1.37 63 1.00
GRE 2.47 2.47 60 0.00
HUN 1.98 2.36 62 1.00
IRE 0.88 0.90 65 1.00
IT 1.75 1.67 57 0.00
JAP 0.87 0.86 60 0.00
KOR 1.09 1.04 55 0.00
MEX 0.93 0.85 65 0.00
NDL 2.28 2.30 60 0.00
NZ 1.00 0.92 65 0.00
NW 1.53 1.55 67 0.00
POL 1.58 1.67 65 1.00
POR 1.39 1.55 55 0.00
SLV 1.46 1.62 60 1.00
SPN 2.10 1.89 60 0.00
SWD 1.59 1.43 61 0.00
TUR 2.24 2.78 60 0.00
UK 0.79 0.91 65 0.00
US 1.00 1.00 62 0.00
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9 Appendix B: Numerical Methods
The algorithm used to compute the equilibrium of the model is similar to
Hugget & Ventura (1999) The following steps describe the salient features of
the computation:
1. Choose an initial value of aggregate capital (K0), aggregate labor in
efficiency units (L0), accidental bequests (B0) and payroll tax (τ0)
2. For these values I solve iterating backwards, starting from V (x,A) =
0, the Bellman’s equation of the individual at each point of the in-
dividual state space (k, zw, e¯). As a result I get the policy functions
c(x, a),k′(x, a),h(x, a) for every a = 1, . . . , A
3. I compute the distributions over the individual’s state space (Ψa(a))
using Montecarlo’s simulations. I start assuming that individuals start
with a capital equal to accidental bequests, average earnings of zero and
an initial draw of productivity belonging to the stationary distribution
of zw
4. I update K0,L0,B0 and τ0 aggregating over the simulated distributions
to K1,L1,B1 and τ1
5. If aggregate variables in the previous point are close enough and product
markets clear, I stop iterations. Otherwise I continue until convergence.
I choose 100 points for the individual capital, 30 points for the idiosyncratic
shock and 4 points for average earnings. I use golden section search at each
point of the individual state for each employment status (0 or h¯) and then
choose the maximum between these two numbers. I use 40,000 observations
for each age group for the Montecarlo step.
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